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ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to defend the structural concept of representation, as defined by homomor-
phisms, against its main objections, namely: logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation, the 
objection from failing necessity, and the copy theory objection. The logical objections can be met by re-
serving the relation ‘to be homomorphic to’ for the explication of potential representation (or, of the repre-
sentational content). Actual reference objects (‘targets’) of representations are determined by (intentional or 
causal) representational mechanisms. Appealing to the independence of the dimensions of ‘content’ and 
‘target’ also helps to see how the structural concept can cope with misrepresentation. Finally, I argue that 
homomorphic representations are not necessarily ‘copies’ of their representanda, and thus can convey sci-
entific insight. 
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1. Introduction 
What is the essence of representation? This question has motivated a lively debate 
within both philosophy of science and the cognitive sciences. Discussions of this issue 
center on two questions. First, is the concept of representation appropriate and useful 
for the study of cognitive processes? Second, can representation, in general, be under-
stood as a transfer of structure, from some original domain to some representing do-
main? The focus of this paper is on the second question. The structural concept of 
representation, as I call it in this paper, has been advocated by Mundy (1986), Watson 
(1995), Swoyer (1991) and French (2003), but resolutely rejected by Goodman (1976), 
Scholz (1991), Grush (1995), Hughes (1997), Suárez (2003, 2004), Bailer-Jones (2003) 
and others. Generally, those who reject the structural concept of representation do so 
for conceptual, not empirical, reasons (an exception is Grush (1995)). In what follows, 
I shall defend the structural concept of representation by demonstrating that the con-
ceptual objections can be refuted. After introducing the structural concept of repre-
sentation (section 2), I shall challenge the main objections against the structural con-
cept of representation: logical objections (section 3), the objection from misrepresen-
tation (section 4), the objection from failing necessity (section 5), and the copy theory 
objection (section 6).  
2. The Structural Concept of Representation  
The structural concept of representation claims that something, B, can represent some-
thing, A, only if some structure of the represented domain A is transferred to its im-
age B. To make this idea more precise, A (the domain to be represented) and B (the 
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domain representing A) are described by similar1 relational structures. A relational struc-
ture is given by a set, on which one- up to n-place relations R1A … RmA (respectively 
R1B … RmB) are defined. Now a mapping f : A → B can be defined which maps A onto 
B. The mapping f is not necessarily one-to-one and satisfies two following conditions: 
 (i) For all j and all elements ai of A: if RjB ( f (a1), … , f (an )), then RjA (a1, … , an) 
Condition (i) requires that for all relations RjB, if some images f (a1) … f (an) of the ar-
guments a1, … , an under f satisfy the relation, then the arguments also satisfy the cor-
responding relation RjA on A. If that is the case, then f is called a faithful mapping of A 
onto B. Representations should be modeled by means of faithful mappings. Otherwise 
there may be facts in the representing domain to which there are no corresponding 
facts in the represented domain. 
 The second condition is that the facts in B give complete information about facts in 
A, that is, for every fact in A there must be a corresponding (representing) fact in B. 
 (ii) For all j and all elements ai of A: if RjA (a1, … , an), then RjB ( f (a1), … , f (an)) 
If (i) and (ii) are fulfilled, f is a homomorphism from A onto B, and B, by virtue of the 
existence of f, can be said to be an homomorphic image of A (Dunn and Hardegree 2001, 
15). The structural concept of representation claims that B represents A only if B is a 
homomorphic image of A. (In the following, if B is an homomorphic image of A, I 
will say that ‘A is homomorphic to B’).  
 In section 3, I shall discuss a differentiation concerning ‘B represents A’ that turns 
out to be a necessary reaction to the logical objections against the structural concept 
of representation. I shall then introduce two independent components of the relation 
of representation: the representational content and the target of the representation. Ac-
cordingly, ‘B represents A’ can either mean ‘A is a part of the representational content 
of B’ or ‘A is the target (reference object) of B’. Understood in the first sense, ‘B 
represents A’ is to be explained by the relation of A being homomorphic to B. How-
ever, the component of the relation of representation in the second sense cannot be 
understood by means of homomorphisms; I shall explain this in more detail in section 3.  
 In section 6, I shall discuss the reasons for employing homomorphism rather than 
isomorphism for modelling the representation relation. (Indeed, the failure to distin-
guish between homomorphism and isomorphism may be the main source of the copy-
theory misunderstanding with respect to homomorphisms). For now, I shall merely 
cite the example given by Dunn and Hardegree (2001) for the case of homomorph-
ism. They note that a photographic image (a clear case of representation) ‘is not iso-
morphic to its subject, even in the ideal, for at least the following reasons: (1) the im-
age is two-dimensional, whereas the subject is three-dimensional; (2) the image depicts 
                                                     
1 Two relational structures A and B are similar, if they are of the same type, that is, if all corresponding 
relations on A and B have the same number of arguments (see Dunn and Hardegree 2001, 10). 
Defending the Structural Concept of Representation 9 
only the surface of the subject, whereas the subject presumably has inner detail, not 
conveyed by the image; (3) the image may be in black and white, whereas the subject 
is presumably ‘in color’ (Dunn and Hardegree 2001, 15). As the example shows, to 
take isomorphisms as the core of representation would fail even with regard to some 
very common instances of representation. 
 On the other hand, it has to be admitted that ‘homomorphism’ is a very general 
notion, which has to be filled out by some specific types of mappings to model con-
crete cases of representation. The objects of homomorphic representations can, for 
instance, be perceptual objects. A specific type of relations, defined on the represent-
ing domain, are geometrical structures (distance structures on vector spaces) as they 
are used by Peter Gärdenfors to model conceptual representations (see Gärdenfors 
2000), or mereological structures, as they may be useful to model non-conceptual rep-
resentations. In all these cases, different concrete types of relations specify the rela-
tions defining the relational structures, but the claim in all the cases is that structures 
are transferred from the represented to the representing domain. 
 Homomorphisms, as defined above, describe an idealized case. The conditions 
that hold for homomorphisms can be weakened so as to fit the cases in which repre-
sentations do not work perfectly. This can happen with respect to two criteria: faith-
fulness and completeness. 
 The faithfulness that is required in the definition of homomorphisms is in a sense 
‘absolute’, as the satisfaction of the corresponding relation in the represented domain 
A is required with respect to all ur-images of f (a1), … , f (an). (Since f is not necessarily 
one-to-one, there can be more than one ur-image.). The absolute condition of faith-
fulness for the information the representation provides about the represented domain 
may be weakened to the restricted notion of ‘minimal fidelity’. This weaker notion only 
requires that there are ur-images which satisfy the corresponding relation defined on 
A.2 Compared to absolute faithfulness, this notion ensures that for every fact in B 
there is a corresponding fact in A. If a representational mechanism fulfils only mini-
mal fidelity, the representation may lead to false expectations concerning facts in the 
represented domain A. For instance, the visual system of an organism indicates direc-
tions of stimuli in the visual field only up to a range of fuzzyness; the representational 
mechanism then produces non-exact representations (as it is to be expected for repre-
sentational mechanisms in the biological world). 
 Non-exact representations blur some of the fine grained differences existing in the 
represented domain. In other words, their representational content does not reflect 
those differences. In order to be able to describe the representational content even in 
those cases by means of the transduced homomorphic structure, we have to ‘adapt’ 
the represented domain A by identifying all arguments in A which are mapped to the 
same element of B by the function f; thereby the old arguments of f are replaced by 
new arguments which are equivalence classes of old arguments (the equivalence rela-
tion being the relation of ‘being mapped to the same element of B’). By this identifica-
                                                     
2 This condition is called ‘minimal fidelity’ by Dunn and Hardegree 2001, 17. 
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tion procedure the description of representational content by means of transduced 
homomorphic structure can be restored. In the extreme, the representation blurs all 
differences existing in A. Then the representation has degenerated into a detector of 
A-like events.  
 The conditions that hold for homomorphisms can also be weakened with regard to 
completeness. In the ideal case, facts about A are preserved by facts about B ‘for all j ’, 
i.e. for all relations that are defined on A. In less ideal cases, there may only exist some 
relations for which this preservation holds. In one type of weakening the homomorph-
ism can be trivially eliminated by cutting off from the relational structure A all rela-
tions for which the homomorphism-condition is not satisfied.3 A second type of 
weakening allows a representation to represent a certain property or relation only for a 
limited range of arguments.4 For example, the representational capacity can be limited to a 
certain region of stimuli from the environment. The visual system of an organism, for 
instance, is sensitive only for a certain range of wave lengths.  
 The fewer relations for which the transfer of structure holds, and the fewer the 
number of elements of A to which the transfer is restricted, the poorer the representa-
tion will be with respect to content. In an extreme case, no content will be left. 
3. Logical Objections 
Many critics of the structural concept of representation think that the concept, first of 
all, fails to meet the most obvious logical conditions for defining representation. One 
difficulty evaluating those objections is that the critics’ attacks are directed against 
what they call the ‘similarity theory of representation’ (Goodman 1976) or the ‘iso-
morphism conception of representation’ (cf. Scholz 1991,5 Suárez 2003, 2004). Simi-
                                                     
3 In the same vein, Swoyer (1991, 470f.) discusses cases of representations in which the mapping between 
the represented and the representing domain ‘does not respect all of the relations in the original sys-
tem, but only some’. One of his examples is the two-dimensional projection of a sphere that ‘cannot 
depict all of its features without distortion, so when we use flat maps to represent the Earth, some-
thing has to give’. The structural theory of representation can be accommodated to those cases, ac-
cording to Swoyer, by restricting the operation of the representing function to the respected relations 
(Swoyer 1991, 472). French and da Costa (2003) have coined the notion of a ‘partial isomorphism’ to 
describe representation relations, which are restricted in their scope to a certain substructure of a 
given structured domain. For instance, the representation provided by the billiard ball model for 
gases, as described by the kinetic theory of gases, is a representation “in certain respects and to cer-
tain degrees” (French and da Costa 2003, 49), and therefore has to be described by partial isomor-
phisms operating on partial structures.  
4 This sort of weakening of the homomorhism conditions is discussed by Swoyer (1991, 470/71): ‘In 
some cases of representation, relations are respected only under certain conditions (e.g., boundary 
conditions). For example, a mercury thermometer may reliably represent the temperature if it is nei-
ther too hot nor too cold, but it would fare poorly in liquid helium or near the surface of the sun.’ 
5 According to Scholz, isomorphisms not only lack adequate logical properties for explaining the repre-
sentation relation, but also is in danger of trivialization (see Scholz 1991, 59). According to this argu-
ment, it is possible to define an isomorphism between arbitrary complexes. Now, if my television set, 
by means of its being isomorphic to my body, were a representation of my body, the whole structural 
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larity, or isomorphism, it is argued, lack adequate logical properties for explaining rep-
resentation relations, because (i) representation relations are non-reflexive, whereas simi-
larity (and isomorphism) are reflexive, and (ii) representation relations are non-
symmetric, whereas similarity (and isomorphism) are symmetric. Since ‘to be homomor-
phic to’ is non-symmetric, only objection (i) can also be raised automatically against 
the homomorphism theory of representation. Nevertheless, objection (i) suffices to 
show that in general, for A to be represented by B, it would not be sufficient that A is 
homomorphic to B. There has to be some additional component of the representation 
relation, which prevents that each object, endowed with a relational structure, repre-
sents itself.  
 The locus classicus for logical objections against the structural concept of representa-
tion is Goodman’s Languages of Art. 
The most naive view of representation might perhaps be put somewhat like this: “A represents B 
if and only if A appreciably resembles B”, or “A represents B to the extent that A resembles B”. 
Vestiges of this view, with assorted refinements, persist in most writing on representation. Yet 
more error could hardly be compressed into so short a formula. Some of the faults are obvious 
enough. An object resembles itself to the maximum degree but rarely represents itself; resem-
blance, unlike representation, is reflexive. Again, unlike representation, resemblance is symmetric: 
B is as much like A as A is like B, but while a painting may represent the Duke of Wellington, the 
Duke doesn’t represent the painting. Furthermore, in many cases neither one of a pair of very 
like objects represents the other: none of the automobiles off an assembly line is a picture of any 
of the rest; and a man is not normally a representation of another man, even his twin brother. 
Plainly, resemblance in any degree is no sufficient condition for representation. (Goodman 1976, 
3-4)  
 Goodman makes three points: the reflexivity and symmetry objections, and he 
notes that objects resembling each other do not necessarily also represent each other. 
Goodman’s criticism is, with the exception of the symmetry objection (ii), also appro-
priate with respect to the homomorphism theory of representation. The proponent of 
the homomorphism theory has to admit that the extension of ‘to represent’ is at most 
a proper subset of the extension of the relation ‘to be homomorphic to’, and he is 
obliged to explain why the extensions do not coincide.  
 In order to explain why the extensions do not coincide, I shall introduce the 
distinction between potential representations and actual representations. B is a potential 
representation of A, if B can be used to correctly represent A, given the existence of 
some representational mechanism connecting A with B. I will say, then, that A is part of 
the representational content of B. For example, one can use a road map to correctly 
                                                                                                                                       
similarity theory would be trivialized. The force of this argument is not very strong. Of course, it will 
be possible to identify the same number of parts in both of the complexes, the television set and my 
body, and it will also be possible to impose relations on these complexes such that there is a one-to-
one mapping between them, preserving the relations. For instance, simply take the relation of ‘being 
identical with’ for both complexes. Now the claim is that my television set would have to be accepted 
as a representation of my body with respect to this relation. I have no problem with admitting this, 
since this merely means that there exist rather uninteresting forms of representation. What makes a 
representation interesting is that the preserved relations tell us something important about the object 
to be represented with respect to the representational context. 
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represent one’s way home, if one intentionally takes a certain red curve on the map to 
stand for the highway which one has to pass etc. Since the road map is endowed with 
the relevant structure, it entails a potential representation of his or her way home that 
can be exploited by means of an intentional representational mechanism. Thus, I shall 
claim that A being homomorphic to B is sufficient for A to be potentially represented 
by B, i.e. that the extensions of the relations ‘to be homomorphic to’ and ‘to represent 
potentially’ coincide. In order for B to be also a correct actual representation of A, A 
has to be selected as the target of the representation from the set of objects potentially 
represented by B (i.e., from the content of B) by some representational mechanism 
connecting A with B. If there is a representational mechanism connecting A with B, 
but B is not a potential representation of A, then B misrepresents A. 
 The most important sorts of representational mechanisms are representational inten-
tions and causal relations. The existence (or non-existence) of representational mecha-
nisms of these sorts explains how we get (or fail to get) actual representations out of 
potential ones. For example, a chair, considered as a structured object formed by its 
parts, is homomorphic to itself, and therefore potentially represents itself. But in this 
case a representational intention has to occur, in order to turn this potential represen-
tation into an actual representation. The chair usually does not represent anything, but 
serves a certain purpose. On the other hand, if you find the chair being an exhibit in 
an art exhibition, then the idea is not too far fetched that the chair might be an (actual) 
representation of something. Now if you ask what kind of thing the chair represents, 
it may turn out that the artist intends, by placing the chair in a certain place or way, 
that the chair (reflexively) represents itself, in order to suggest to the visitor of the ex-
hibition that a thing is not necessarily what it is most of the time, namely something 
made for a certain purpose, but that it can also be seen as ‘standing for itself’. The in-
tention of the artist figures as a representational mechanism turning a potential repre-
sentation into an actual representation. Thus, Goodman was right to insist that, as a 
matter of fact, ‘an object rarely represents itself’. But we now see that this does not 
count against a structural concept of representation. Instead, it brings to our attention 
the requirement that to make something an actual representation of itself representa-
tional mechanisms are needed, and that this requirement is rarely satisfied.  
 Causal representational mechanisms are exemplified by photography. A photo-
graph may be a potential representation of my son, and vice versa. But it is an actual 
representation only in one direction, because there is a one-way causal process con-
necting the light rays emanating from my son’s body and resulting in the photography, 
but not the other way round. Nevertheless, there may be ‘irregular’ contexts, in which 
representational intentions do not follow the regular causal direction. Again, Good-
man is right in insisting ‘the Duke doesn’t represent the painting.’ But in some odd 
contexts, the Duke could nevertheless be seen as representing the painting of the 
Duke. Imagine, for example, an impoverished Duke who is now forced to imitate the 
painting on fairs. Perhaps the painting has become famous during the Duke’s personal 
decline. Whereas in the common context of portrait painting only pairs of the relation 
are used to instantiate actual representations in which the first element is a person, and 
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the second a picture, a pair with the reversed order fulfils the actual representation re-
lation in this strange example. 
 Causal or intentional representational mechanisms also determine how the relational 
structures that are related by the homomorphism are defined: this includes the identifi-
cation of the elements of the base set and the relations that are seen as relevant for be-
ing represented with respect to the context in question. I refer to all this as the prag-
matic conditions of actual representations (see Bailer-Jones 2003). My concern, in this 
paper however, is potential representation as the necessary condition of correct actual 
representation. It was my aim in this section to show that the standard logical objec-
tions against the structural concept of representation don’t have the force to exclude a 
homomorphism conception of potential representation. The structural properties of 
an object determine what the object potentially represents. If these representational 
resources are exploited by intentional users or by causal processes, then actual repre-
sentations emerge. 
4. The Objection from Misrepresentation 
A second general objection against the homomorphism theory of representation is 
that homomorphisms do not allow for misrepresentations. Misrepresentation is a 
common empirical phenomenon, thus no concept of representation will be empiri-
cally adequate without being able to explain it. What is more, permitting misrepresen-
tation is a condition of conceptual adequacy, since the very concept of representation pre-
supposes the possibility of a distinction between the case in which some X misrepresents 
some Y and the case, in which X does not represent Y at all.  
 Why are homomorphisms perceived to be unable to fulfill this condition? The rea-
son is that a homomorphism between relational structures A and B either exists or 
does not exist; in the first case, B represents A, whereas in the second case B does not 
represent A. What would it mean for B to represent A, but incorrectly?  
 Contrary to first appearances, the homomorphism theory does not have problems 
to allow for misrepresentation. If B represents A, then B refers to A. There is also a con-
tent of that representation which is not necessarily identical with its reference. B mis-
represents A just in case B refers to A but the representational content does not entail 
A. Intuitively this means that B is about A, but does not match A in what it says 
about A. Problems with misrepresentation arise because some theories of representa-
tion do not have the resources to identify reference and content independently. If and 
only if reference and content are conceptually identified do we lack resources to ex-
plain misrepresentation. The following demonstrates that this is not the case for the 
homomorphism theory:  
(a) According to the homomorphism theory the reference of B is A iff A is the 
target of B, which is determined by a representational mechanism.6
                                                     
6 The notion of a ‘target’ follows Cummins (1996). But whereas in Cummins’ sense, the target is deter-
mined by the intended use a certain representational state is supposed to serve, I assume that the ref-
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(b) The content of B entails A iff A is homomorphic to B. 
Hence reference and content do not coincide from which it follows that misrepresen-
tation is possible 
 This shows that the impression of the theories’ inability to cope with misrepresen-
tation arises from the wrong assumption that by the existence of a homomorphism 
between A and B the reference of B would be determined. This assumption cannot be 
right, simply because no unique reference object for B can be determined on the basis 
of the property of being homomorphic to B. Therefore, the determination of a refer-
ence object for B has to be explained independently of the homomorphism theory. 
The reference of B is fixed by a representational mechanism, i.e. either by an inten-
tional or a causal process (cf. section 3). In contrast, the representational content of B is 
determined by B’s structural properties, i.e. by the relational structure B is endowed 
with. This relational structure of B determines what objects (which are themselves re-
lational structures) are homomorphic to B, i.e. it determines the set of objects that are 
potentially represented by B (cf. section 3). Thus, the representational content of B is iden-
tical with the set of objects that are potentially represented by B. Reference objects for 
B will be determined independently of the content of B. If a reference object for B is 
chosen by a representational mechanism out of the set of objects potentially repre-
sented by B, then B will correctly represent this object. If a reference object for B is 
chosen which does not belong to this set, then this reference object will be misrepre-
sented by B. Thus, the case in which something A is misrepresented by B and the case 
in which A is not represented by B (i.e. A is not a reference object of B) are clearly dis-
tinct. This means that the homomorphism theory of representation has the resources 
to explain misrepresentation.  
 A nice example of the ability of the homomorphism theory to explain misrepresen-
tation is Cummins’ (1996) example of a chess computer. The calculations of the chess 
computer are intended (by the constructor) to result in a certain position, in response 
to the moves of the computer’s opponent (this position is the target, or the reference ob-
ject), but —by some failure in the computer’s architecture— the computer performs 
by indicating a different position. The relevant structure of this different position is 
the representational content and the appearance of a difference between the two positions 
means that a misrepresentation has occurred (see Cummins 1996, 5f.). 
5. The Objection that Homomorphism is not Necessary 
Even if it is accepted that the structural concept is able to overcome both the logical 
and the misrepresentation objections, this may only mean that some representations 
may exhibit homomorphic structure. But perhaps homomorphisms are not necessary 
for representations? Indeed, most critics (e.g. Scholz 1991, Suárez 2004) argue that 
homomorphism is neither sufficient nor necessary for representation. Instead of going 
                                                                                                                                       
erence could also be fixed causally. I do not intend in this paper to give any reasons that could favour 
one theory of reference against some other theory.  
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into the details of their argumentation, with regard to this objection, I prefer to con-
sider two types of phenomena that are, as far as I can see, the most obvious paradigms 
of representation that allegedly work without homomorphism. In the first case, the re-
sult will be that representations are involved, but (contrary to first appearances) in-
voke homomorphisms, whereas in the second case, it will turn out that no representa-
tions are involved. The first paradigm type is detectors that have no internal structure.  
 There are both natural and artificial systems using some detector systems in order 
to represent certain conditions occurring in their environment, but the detectors can-
not be interpreted as being homomorphically related to the represented condition. 
Examples are the detection of the direction of the magnetic field by the magneto-
somes of sea bacteria, or neuronal systems in the human retina that are able to detect 
certain directions of moved stimuli occuring in the visual field (see Goldstein 1996, 
274). The representation,7 in the latter example, is performed by ‘yes’- or ‘no’-answers 
which are produced by the neuronal system corresponding to whether the stimulus 
occurs within a given range of spatial directions or not. 
 The answer given by the detector system depends on whether the direction of the 
stimulus occurring in the visual field is such as to generate neuronal inputs which are 
transduced through the system up to the central neuron. The firing of the central neu-
ron then means a ‘yes’-answer of the system with regard to the stimulus. In that case, 
the system represents the corresponding type of stimuli. If the inputs inhibit each 
other, the signal is cancelled out with the result that no firing of the central neuron 
occurs. This means a ‘no’-answer of the system. It is crucial for the answer of the sys-
tem, in which direction the stimulus moves through the visual field. The direction de-
termines, in what temporal succession the neuronal inputs enter the detector system, 
and the succession determines whether the inhibiting neuronal connections are able to 
cancel out the signal or not. For each direction, there is an optimal detector, such that 
to stimuli in that direction it is maximally responsive, whereas stimuli moving in the 
opposite direction are completely ignored by the detector.  
 Whether a certain type of stimuli is represented by the neuronal system, depends 
on whether its direction fits the internal structure of the system. The detector system is 
like a lock in that a key (the direction in which the stimulus moves) fits or not. Since 
the internal neuronal structure of the detector explains its representational perform-
ance, the internal structure of some detector may be seen as determining its represen-
tational content. But, there is no internal structure of some single stimulus. Thus, a 
‘yes’-answer of the system corresponding to that stimulus cannot be explained by the 
existence of a homomorphism between the stimulus (described as a relational struc-
ture) and the neuronal system. This means that a single neuronal detector does not repre-
sent a single stimulus by means of the stimulus being homomorphic to the detector. The 
                                                     
7 Neuronal detectors of direction stimuli are typical examples of representations described in studies of 
human and animal visual systems. I will presuppose that such examples have to be understood as rep-
resentations by any serious theory of representation.  
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single neuronal detector has no representational content in the sense of the homo-
morphism theory. 
 Representation occurs in this case in the first instance not between the single con-
crete entities but between the stimulus space S and the detector-space D, by means of 
a homomorphism d operating between the space of all types of stimuli (each defined 
by a certain direction α) and the corresponding detectors d(α). The stimulus-types are 
related by rotations with respect to the horizontal plane through the retina, and the 
same applies to the corresponding detector systems. Thus, the homomorphism d pre-
serves the connection structure of mappings (rotations) o on S, since every mapping 
on S corresponds to a mapping o* on D (which is a rotation of detectors):8
 For rotations r1 and r2 on S: d(r1 o r2) = d(r1) o* d(r2). 
The representation that holds in the first instance between the spaces induces a repre-
sentation in a derivative sense also between single stimuli and single detectors by 
means of their occupying corresponding places in the homomorphic mapping struc-
tures. 
 The second paradigm case of alleged representations that work without homo-
morphisms are intentional denotations by arbitrary signs, be they pencils representing 
kings in a child’s play, coins standing for soccer players used to demonstrate a possible 
move, or what ever. Arbitrary signs denoting objects, phenomena, situations, or types of 
behavior, are often held to be the paradigmatic instances of representation. Indeed, an 
arbitrary sign has something of a representation, insofar as some intentional represen-
tational mechanism (a decision about its denotation) has assigned it to a reference ob-
ject. But an arbitrary sign cannot misrepresent. The reference object to which the sign 
has been assigned by an intentional act cannot fail to belong to the set of objects po-
tentially represented by the sign, that is, it cannot fail to belong to the representational 
content of the sign. The reason is that the sign simply has no representational content. 
In order to have representational content conceptually independent of its reference 
object, there would need to be properties of the sign delimiting the set of objects the 
sign could be correctly used to represent. Since, by definition, no property of an arbi-
trary sign has any representational relevance (beside the denotation act applied to it), 
arbitrary signs cannot misrepresent. Since, for any conception of representation, per-
mitting misrepresentation is a condition of conceptual adequacy (cf. section 4), arbitrary 
signs, contrary to first appearances, are not representations.  
 Even Nelson Goodman, supposedly one of the main advocates of the denotation 
view, has actually been very sceptical about denotation as a means of representation. 
                                                     
8 Representations that work by transducing the connection structure of the represented domain to the 
representing domain are discussed by Ibarra and Mormann (2000) under the notion of homology. Con-
trary to what is claimed by Suárez (2004, 769), the homology theory explains representation as struc-
tural relation between the represented and the representing domain; both, the represented and the 
representing domain are conceived of as algebraic structures, namely as group structures of mor-
phisms, and the relation between them is ‘structural’, since it is a homomorphism operating on the 
group structures.  
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True, Goodman argues that ‘[d]enotation is the core of representation and is inde-
pendent of resemblance’ (Goodman 1976, 5). This means that the reference of a repre-
sentation cannot be determined by similarity, but has to be conceived as a primitive 
relation. On the other hand, he notes that representations, for instance paintings, do 
have a content that is independent of the denotation (reference). Now, the fact that 
paintings can have content but not necessarily denotation (for example, a painting of a 
unicorn does not refer to an actual object) makes things difficult for a pure denotation 
view: ‘a picture must denote a man to represent him, but need not denote anything to 
be a man representation’ (Goodman 1976, 25). 
 From considerations like these it follows that denotation is not even a necessary 
component in the explanation of representational content. Thus, the ability of some-
thing to represent, in the sense of having representational content, has nothing to do 
with its denotation. It is simply contingent, whether a painting has a denotation or 
not, although the painting has representational content in any case. Goodman is very 
explicit in some places in Languages of Art that (in cases, where denotation is not null) 
denotation alone does not suffice to make something a representation of something 
else. After all, an officer may use the paintings of a museum which has been occupied 
by his unit to denote the positions held by the enemy. In cases like that, no represen-
tation appears. In order to represent, the content of a painting has to relate to its deno-
tation in some adequate way, such that ‘what is denoted depends solely upon the pic-
torial properties of the symbol’ (Goodman 1976, 42).  
 If representation could be constituted merely by denotation, we would get a con-
cept of representation so weak that it would not be possible, for example, to explain 
interesting abilities of organisms like the successful homing behavior of desert ants by 
means of their ability to represent their own movements in their environment (see 
Gallistel 1990, 59f.). True, representations denote what they represent, but to under-
stand how an organism performs well using a certain representational system we have 
to consider the specific contents of the representation and how they relate to its refer-
ence objects. Content is a necessary component of representation, and homomor-
phisms are necessary to explain this necessary component. 
6. The Copy Theory Objection 
Finally, I want to reject the common, but misguided view that the homomorphism 
theory is nothing more than a (more precise) version of the similarity theory of repre-
sentation. My impression is that this misconception builds the core of the bundle of 
arguments against the theory that I have discussed before. 
 In section 3 it was noted that ‘to be homomorphic to’ is not a symmetric relation. 
Therefore, this relation is not a ‘similarity’. Similarities are reflexive and symmetric. 
Since the notion of a ‘similarity theory of representation’ has never been made very 
clear, many (and often misplaced) connotations can invade that notion. One of the 
most popular connotations is that of a copy theory. The following short remarks are in-
tended to show how the homomorphism theory is distinguished from a copy theory 
of representation: 
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 It is a very common phenomenon that classes of objects be used to represent a 
given domain, for which no analogous intrinsic relations exist. For example, the natural 
numbers are represented by decimal symbols, although finite sequences of decimal 
symbols do not possess any intrinsic structure similar to the relation of addition de-
fined on the natural numbers. In this case, we extrinsically endow the system of decimal 
symbols with the desired structure by imposing rules of calculation, in order to enable 
them to represent the addition structure of the natural numbers (such that the decimal 
representation of the sum of two natural numbers equals the sum of the decimal rep-
resentations).  
 The representing objects very often are not simply there, but have to be con-
structed together with their relational structure for a certain representational use. In 
such cases, only when those objects have been constructed, the representandum can 
be identified with some part of the newly built object class (it is then said that the rep-
resentandum has been embedded into the new domain). The representing domain is 
then not a ‘copy’ of the original domain in a twofold sense: firstly, because the repre-
senting domain is the result of a construction, and secondly, because the representing 
domain includes the original domain as a subdomain. For an example see Carnap’s 
construction of ‘quality classes’ as representations (logical reconstructions) of intuitive 
perceptual qualities (Carnap 1998, 98). In this case, neither the representandum, 
namely the qualities, nor the entities which represent them, are simply ‘given’. The 
qualities exist only in the sense that it is a common way of speaking to refer to ‘quali-
ties’ as ‘parts’ of elementary experiences. This common way of speaking is, from the 
phenomenal perspective, incorrect. From such a perspective, elementary experiences 
do not have any parts. This incorrect mode of speech, according to Carnap, has to be 
replaced by a correct explication of ‘qualities’ by means of a logical reconstruction of 
quality classes. Thus, the quality classes themselves are clearly not ‘given’ before the 
representation procedure starts.  
 Carnap’s guideline for the construction of quality classes is that the classes have to 
fulfill a certain structural characterization: a quality class counts as an adequate recon-
struction of a certain quality if the elementary experiences belonging to this quality 
class relate to each other in the same way as elementary experiences relate to each 
other when they ‘contain’ that quality. Quality classes exemplify qualities, that is, they 
are taken as models of the common expression ‘some two elementary experiences 
contain the same quality’. Whereas ‘copying’ of something does not lead to any new 
knowledge about that something, the construction of new objects —given the con-
straint of structure preservation, as explained above— may improve our knowledge 
with respect to both, its precision and its scope. 
 These cases demonstrate how representations can be generated by homomor-
phisms, although they are not ‘copies’. The decimal representation does not copy the 
additive structure of the natural numbers, and Carnap’s quality classes do not copy the 
qualities of our phenomenal experience. As I hope, the reader will be convinced by 
now that the most common conceptual objections against the structural concept of 
representation are misplaced. They seem to originate from a common source, the 
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copy theory misunderstanding. As this misunderstanding is swept away in the light of 
the notion of homomorphism, a more promising pursuit with regard to the structural 
theory is waiting: the pursuit of its empirical prospects. 
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